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The history of inter­group and international conflict reveals a few commonali­
ties. The object of adversaries is to disadvantage one another by killing, injuring,
immobilizing, defeating, or conquering. A major resource in conflict, moreover,
is the ability of one combatant to outwit adversaries by unanticipated attack and
other surprises, and to anticipate others’ surprises by spying, infiltration, and
other means of gathering intelligence. Finally, for any type of conflict, activities
necessary for carrying it out usually become routinized into definite forms,
including armies, navies, systems of training combatants, and systems of intel­
ligence and battle strategy. All these may be regarded as ways of mastering the
uncertainties of conflict and thereby securing advantage.
To some degree this process of routinization can be found in the brief history of
modern international terrorism – which I date somewhat arbitrarily from the
middle­Eastern episodes of the 1960s. By now the contemporary pattern of ter­
rorist activities is known – extreme decentralization, local coordination rather
than centralized command, shifting objects of attack, reliance on extreme irregu­
larity and surprise, capitalizing on computer technology, and relying on totalistic
commitment to religious, national, and regional ideologies. Our capacity to con­
front this pattern has become somewhat routinized, too, as we learn, painfully but
reluctantly, that traditional armed forces equipped to fight national wars are in­
creasingly inappropriate weapons against terrorism, that information must be
shared internationally, and that foiling terrorism through cooperative efforts is
more workable than trying to crush it. At the same time, adaptation remains in­
complete, and a number of serious dilemmas hound our adaptive efforts. These
dilemmas are many, and most are not entirely new. They have, however, been
given distinctive new twists by the specific nature of contemporary terrorism.
Terrorism is impossible to define
While almost all who think about terrorism feel compelled to offer a definition,
there is no agreement; hundreds of definitions have been found in the litera­
ture. Part of the confusion arises from terrorism’s novelty: it does not fit com­
fortably into standard definitions of war, crime, and political protest, though it
is in some respects all of these. Part arises from historical myopia: historians
and contemporary scholars alike fashion definitions from specific historical
manifestations and proclaim these as generic. Part arises from the fact that ter­
rorists, victims, the media, and “the public” react to different facets of the phe­
nomenon. And part arises from the fact that the word is used in mainly norma­
tive ways; labeling disliked actions of enemies as “terrorist”but never confessing
to “terrorism” oneself.
From my own scholarship I concluded that a systematic definition is impossible,
even though I could not resist defining it and defending that definition: “Terror­
ism is intended, irregular acts of violence or disruption (or the threat of them),
carried out in secret with the effect of generating anxiety in a group and with
the further aim, via that effect, of exciting political response or political change.”
But I also recognized certain ambiguities and difficulties in my own version.
This impossibility of definition has real consequences: the recent American
struggle over whether to try terrorists in military or civilian courts may be
written off as partisan conflict between Republican hawks and Democratic
doves, but at the same time it expresses the fundamental dilemma as to wheth­
er terrorism is to be defined as a form of war or a form of crime.
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Kurzgefasst: Terrorismus entzieht
sich aufgrund seines wechselhaften
Charakters einer klaren Definition –
und fordert demokratische Gesell­
schaften in besonderem Maße heraus.
Es gilt, eine Balance zu finden zwi­
schen Überreaktion und Nachlässig­
keit, Offenheit in der Kommunikation
und Geheimniskrämerei, zwischen Si­
cherheit und Wahrung bürgerlicher
Freiheiten. Eine gewisse Routine im
Umgang mit Terror hat sich inzwi­
schen entwickelt, und es hat den An­
schein, dass diskrete internationale
Zusammenarbeit auf Dauer erfolgrei­
cher ist als quasi­militärische Krieg­
führung.
Summary: Terrorism is almost impos­
sible to define and difficult to address
because of its irregularity and chang­
ing nature. Governments and citizens
are confronted with tough challenges,
like finding a balance between securi­
ty and liberty, between transparent
communication and secrecy, between
alarmism and stoicism. It seems that
for foiling terrorism cooperative ef­
forts show more results than aggres­
sive, war­like strategies. But there will
always be remaining risks for free so­
cieties.
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Terrorism appeals to a sense of dispossession
Among terrorism’s many determinants, one is its appeal to a sense of dispos­
session among groups. This is almost a truism. It should also be pointed out that
such sentiments often have roots in historical circumstances largely beyond
our control – the inherited antagonisms from international colonialism, for ex­
ample, or the universality of the nation­state as the preferred mechanism for
social integration, which frequently dispossesses specific integrative groups
based on communal, religious, and ethnic grounds. These “causes” cannot be al­
leviated without a wholesale revision of centuries of history.
With regard to contending with terrorism itself, the multiplicity of its condi­
tions and causes creates dilemmas as to the means to deal with it: should we
ameliorate international injustice? Launch pre­emptive attacks on suspected
groups and nations? Discredit terrorism by propaganda and public relations?
Disrupt ongoing terrorist activities? Protect borders and control movement of
peoples? Bolster defenses of targets of attacks? Any of these might be effective,
but we are not certain about which, carried out in what degree, and in what
combination are optimal. We cannot pursue all of them maximally because of
cost considerations, political constraints, and because terrorist strategies are
elusive and changing. We almost always rely on imperfect knowledge and on
outcomes of struggles among ourselves in determining anti­terrorist strategies.
The balance between being cautious and over-alarming
Whether to publicize or to keep secret information about terrorism is a general
dilemma of wartime situations and is prominent in contending with terrorism. It
also has several facets: (a) Should warning systems against terrorist activity be
frequent and specific or highly selective and situational? This is an especially dif­
ficult question, because, unlike certain disaster situations (for example, flooding,
storm warning) specific terrorist attacks, being secret, typically cannot be identi­
fied as they are approaching. There can only be “risk probabilities”. The troubled
history of the five “color coded” warnings of the Homeland Security Department in
recent United States history illustrates the difficulty. On the one hand, reducing
danger to five “colors” ranging from blue to red conveys little information, espe­
cially about how to behave in response to a given color. Further, those in control
of issuing warnings, concerned with both being inattentive or over­alarming the
public, avoid the “extreme” colors. (b) Should knowledge about terrorism be made
public? A National Academies panel on “making the nation safer” on which I served
came up with its own informed list of what targets – dams, public buildings, elec­
trical grids, computer systems – were more vulnerable or less vulnerable to attack
at that time. Should we have included this diagnosis in our public report or should
we have repressed this as information useful to potential enemies? (c) Should the
mass media be left completely free to publicize terrorism – often an asset to ter­
rorist groups – or should codes of journalistic reporting be enforced, thus inhibit­
ing the valued freedom of the press? None of these are soluble by fixed formulae.
To what degree should the public be “prepared” for terrorism? Closely related to
the publicity­secrecy dilemma is that of preparing the population for the prob­
ability of terrorist attacks. This is also a generic problem that faces nations at
war, but is especially significant in the case of terrorism. A state of war is usu­
ally an enduring state, and the populations of warring nations understand, more
or less, that their respective states are so engaged; possibility of attack is cor­
respondingly normalized. Terrorist situations may also endure, but as far as we
understand them, terrorist attacks are likely to be rare, unanticipated, and de­
signed to catch the target governments and populations unaware. This combina­
tion of rarity, periodicity, and lethality makes for a difficult social­psychological
situation for target populations. Under these circumstances populations are in­
clined to vacillate between alarm and complacency, depending on news, rumors,
and actual incidents. Special issues for authorities are the following:
(a) The perils of under­preparing the public by following a policy of secrecy or
by simply remaining silent. This fosters more confused responses on the part of
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the population when a terrorist event occurs and increases the probability that
authorities will be subsequently blamed for laxness after the fact. This effect
has been called “blame assignation”.
(b) The perils of over­preparing the population with information, exercises, and
drills. At the least this is an irritant to those who are inclined to deny potential
threats; it also excites the “cry wolf” response when warnings occur but attacks
do not and risks blaming authorities for “panicking”.
(c) Unpredictable consequences of communicating with the public. It is a well­
known principle in disaster research that segments of the population – based
on class, ethnic group, neighborhood, categories – are less likely to receive news
and warnings, and that both individuals and groups interpret these differently.
Rumors also distort events and situations and compromise the effectiveness of
official communications.
Political security versus civil liberties
My comparative studies of terrorism suggest that this is a universal problem
accompanying terrorism, as well as war in general. It appears in all forms of
terrorism, because authorities are forever inclined to push the case for gather­
ing information, infiltrating, apprehending, arresting, and punishing suspected
individuals and groups. Mandates to do their job well and mandates to avoid
political criticism press toward this result. At the same time, protecting civil
liberties is one of the foundational elements of political democracy, and sus­
pected violations arouse protests not only from victims but also from a larger
population of liberal­minded groups. The problem is chronic. It has appeared in
efforts to confront domestic terrorism, for example in the United States’ gov­
ernment’s crackdown on black militant groups in the 1960s, and in the episodes
of terrorism in Germany, Italy, and other European countries in the 1970s and
1980s. In the latter historical memories of past totalitarian practices were es­
pecially constraining. This general tension is especially serious because it in­
volves the clash of two sacred principles: the sanctity of national self­protection
and the sanctity of protecting the rights of individual citizens.
National unity versus partisan politics
Wartime usually pulls together national populations and increases solidarity,
trust in leaders, and cooperation. Terrorism as we now experience it lies be­
tween war and non­war, and as a result fails to generate such unifying respons­
es, except in extraordinary instances such as the events of September 11, 2001.
The main story of contemporary terrorism, especially in the adversarial politics
of the United States, is for political parties to seek partisan advantage by blam­
ing the party or past party in power for laxness, extreme reactions, and mis­
guided politics. Such divisions are a source of mischief in the design of delib­
erative, non­partisan responses to terrorist dangers; they constitute an
additional element in the “impurity” of threatened nations’ reactions.
The evident conclusion to this analysis is that, at the present time of history, the
identified dilemmas assure that nations’ responses to international terrorism
will be mixed, conflicted, and only partially effective. Contending with terrorism
appears to be a forever­changing, stumbling, and non­ending process. To think
of “victory” over terrorism – as the analogy of war on against terrorism sug­
gests – is misguided. More appropriate imageries are terrorism as a running
sore, as a long war of attrition, and as a patient struggle against a problem that
is not once­and­for­all soluble.
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